

AN EARLY SINHALESE BUDDHIST TRACT AGAINST THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF CREATION

by Richard Fox Young

Virtually all primary sources, hitherto at our disposal, bearing on Sinhalese Buddhist appraisals of Christianity, came from the period beginning with 1862, the year when MOHOTṬIVATṬE GUṆANANDA (1823–1890), a prominent Theravāda monk of the Amarapura fraternity, founded the Society for the Propagation of Buddhism (Sarvajña Śāsanābhivṛddhidāyaka Dharma Samāgama). The number of anti-Christian tracts, books and periodicals was especially large in the 1870s, for that was the decade when not less than four major public confrontations between monks and missionaries, culminating with the masterful performance of Mohoṭṭivattē in the open-air debate at Pānadurē, radicalized relations between the two religions. On the Buddhist side, apologetical patterns were then established in which there has been but slight modification in subsequent years.¹

Considering that missionary activity in Ceylon commenced with the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, and was continued – although on a smaller scale – by the Dutch Reformed Church, and was given renewed impetus by British Protestant missionaries, who began their evangelistic campaigns in earnest in 1812, Sinhalese Buddhism's response to Christianity as a doctrinal system was somewhat tardy, although there was little delay in its adjustment to sociological pressures peculiar to the colonial situation, of which Christianity was a major factor. The *Cūlavamsa*, a late appendage to the chronicles of Sinhalese history, the *Mahāvamsa*, registers its protest to depravations against Buddhism committed by the Portuguese and Dutch,² but does not indicate that the religion of these newcomers – if indeed they were perceived to have one – elicited serious interest on a doctrinal level, if only as an exotic species of heresy. Dutch records mention here and there a few interreligious dialogues staged as curiosities, but their contents and agenda, unfortunately, were not disclosed in detail.³ Occasions there must surely have been, where committed Buddhists and Christians met together to discuss their respective doctrines, but only during the British era of missionary activity do traces of anti-Christian writings begin to appear, the transition from oral to literary discussion being symptomatic of the need to challenge and counteract the growing presence of Christianity in Sinhalese society. Slow to be provoked, and even slower to put pen to paper on such a matter as this, Buddhist leaders broke their long-standing silence with respect to Christianity, as previously remarked, in 1862. After this date a deluge of anti-Christian publications flowed forth from Buddhist presses, all but overwhelming in quantity the output of missionary tract and Bible societies that had supplied the island with more literature per capita than all the missionary printing establishments of the Indian mainland combined.⁴

KITSIRI MALALGODA, a Sinhalese sociologist of religion whose study of Buddhist-Christian interaction in the early modern period enters deeply into

this subject, has divided the Buddhist response to Christianity into three phases: the first being a time when Buddhists mainly appealed to government, through recourse to petitions, for toleration and concessions in accordance to the Kandyan Convention of 1815; the middle being the period terminating in the 1860s, during which a sense of injury festered, that Buddhism was being assaulted without provocation by missionaries and government; and the last being "organized and sustained expressions of anti-Christian feelings" that were voiced and put into print by MOHOTIVATTE and others in the Society for the Propagation of Buddhism.⁵

It is to MALALGODA's middle period, when Buddhists though restive were yet uninclined to speak or write in opposition to Christian teachings that the present article will contribute by presenting here a Buddhist anti-Christian tract that in its own time (ca. 1846–47) circulated in the form of palmleaf manuscripts. Although the text at hand is neither literarily nor philosophicaly profound, it offers a more complete example than can elsewhere be found of how Buddhist monks were then quietly at work explaining to laypeople the superiority of the Buddha's teaching vis-à-vis Christianity.⁶

We are at a disadvantage in that the Sinhalese original no longer exists; nor can anything be known about the author beyond what may be surmised. The tract was rendered into English in 1847 by one WILLIAM BRIDGNELL of the Wesleyan Methodist Mission and included in one of his periodic reports to the parent society in London.⁷ We can be reasonably confident that the tract's contents were translated as faithfully as BRIDGNELL's linguistic skills allowed, as missionaries were eager for this kind of writing to come into their possession, believing opposition to be better than indifference – or so they interpreted Buddhist civility.

The untitled tract rebuts an anti-Buddhist broadside, *On the Evidences of the Eternal God*, written by one EBENEZER DANIEL of the Baptist Missionary Society and published by the Society's press in Kandy in 1846.⁸ Though this tract too is now lost, the manner in which it was brought before the public can be seen in one of DANIEL's letters sent to his superiors in London: "I enter a village, and, proceeding from house to house, I sit down on a seat, . . . and endeavour, in the plainest language, and with the most familiar illustrations, to explain the way of salvation. . . . We often meet with little but contempt, opprobrium, and laughter."⁹ It was on such occasions of itinerant preaching as these that DANIEL read, to whatever audience he could assemble, from the above-named tract. And it was to such ordinary village folk that the anonymous Buddhist apologist addressed himself in the simple but compelling sermon style in which Sinhalese monks are trained. If DANIEL's detractors in public were indeed so ill-mannered, his more learned opponent was consistently courteous though not less firm in his rejection of the missionary's premise. DANIEL there argued that the Buddha should have given an answer to the conundrum of causality, and, in refusing to provide one, should be considered a less than competent guide in matters of religion. While it may now seem quite ludicrous to fault the Buddha for this when the logic of his presuppositions about the religious life rule out speculative reasoning of this

sort, an examination of then-contemporary research in the Pali canon as conducted by missionary scholars will clarify why the matter was approached in this fashion.

DANIEL appears to have simply been putting into a controversial format suitable for marketplace harangues conclusions that had been published in the same year (1846) by the most distinguished of all missionaries among the Sinhalese at that time, the Wesleyan DANIEL JOHN GOGERLY (1792–1861), a competent scholar of Pali, whose researches were then concentrated on the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, the Buddha's first sermon in the *Dīgha Nikāya*.¹⁰ Certain statements in this sutta were interpreted by GOGERLY to mean that the Buddha was aware of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* – though not, of course, by that name – but dismissed it without sufficient consideration. The references are indeed curious: The content is set with regard to the heretical contention of certain recluses and brahmins, that some souls and some entities in the world may be eternal and others not. Four reasons are adduced to account for this view but not to directly refute it.

Upon each passing away of the world system (*Samvatta*), certain beings are reborn in the *Ābhassaraloka*, the sixth in a series of sixteen *lokas* (worlds). Among the reborn is Brahmā, who, either because of the time allotted for his existence there expires or because of deficient merit, is reborn once again in another *loka*, the uninhabited Brahmā world. Being alone, he desires a companion; at that juncture and for the same reasons that brought Brahmā there, another being comes into existence in it. Out of conceit, Brahmā supposes that he himself is responsible for this second being's coming-into-being, and deems himself the Creator.¹¹ The second and subsequent entrants into the Brahmā world, unable to recall their previous existences in other worlds, ignorantly concede to this claim. Later, these same beings, due to adverse karmic repercussions, are reborn in this world, and, influenced by their former delusion, disseminate the creator-myth here. This is the first argument advanced to account for this heresy; the second, third, and fourth hold responsible "gods debouched by pleasure" (*Khiddāpadusikā*), "gods debouched in mind" (*Manopadusikā*), and recluses and brahmins infatuated with speculative reasoning.¹²

Noteworthy in this discourse is that the *Brahmajāla* does not present arguments to contradict the idea that some existences are eternal and others not; rather, it asserts that Brahmā, as any sentient being, insect or god, transmigrates from one world to another, that indeed he is not even among the highest of transmigrating beings, having resided only in the sixth *loka*. The emphasis, then, is not upon logical faults in this doctrine; rather, the Buddha, by emphasizing the origin of the creator-idea in the mind of the deluded Brahmā, demonstrates the psychogeny of this view, so inimical to his own.¹³

It was enough for GOGERLY that the idea of creation, even if not strictly *creatio ex nihilo*, was adumbrated in the *Brahmajāla*: "It appears that Buddha had a clear perception of the doctrine of a supreme, self-existing Creator, yet he pronounces that doctrine to be false."¹⁴ GOGERLY's primary purpose as an

academic was to demonstrate by this that the Nepalese Buddhist idea of the Adi Buddha was incompatible with the Pali canon; but his motive as a missionary was to call the Buddha's intellectual competence into question and also to emphasize the difference between the two religions on this point, thereby to draw monks into dispute.

GÖGERLY succeeded in this by writing in Sinhalese *Kristiyāni Prajñāpti* (1st ed., Colombo 1848), part one of which expounded the doctrine that "All things were made by God", in opposition to the Buddha's philosophical system of causation from which a creator is entirely excluded." Too sophisticated to be widely read, the text was simplified for public consumption by GÖGERLY's Sinhalese protégé DAVID DE SILVA in a series of brief pamphlets.¹⁵ It was *Kristiyāni Prajñāpti* and its pericopes edited by DE SILVA that finally prompted MOHOTIVATTE to issue his first anti-Christian periodical in 1862, *Durlabdhi Vinodaniya* [Destroyer of Heresy]. The tract we now have before us, then, is an antecedent, however humble in scope, of the major works produced by Sinhalese Buddhism's outstanding apologist:

"The answer of a Buddhist to a book written by a Christian against the Buddha's religion.

Of a book, dated 1846, which we have had an opportunity of seeing and reading, the prime object is to show that Buddha has said nothing respecting the origin of man; that man is not formed by Brahma, Buddha, or his own parents; that man must have had a cause of existence; that the God called Jehovah, is an eternal being; that t h a t God created man.

To these assertions we answer: That Buddha said nothing concerning man's origin is certain. To have told the cause of man's commencement of being, Buddha must have looked for it: however, as that research was profitless, the successive Buddhas waived the consideration of it.

However, it is asserted that it was wrong not to inquire into the origin of being; and that Buddha should have endeavored to ascertain the truth in reference to this matter. Let us then examine whether this opinion or Buddha's is correct.

If an Englishman, wishing to go to England and having embarked and having arrived at England, refuses to land, and says that he must first ascertain where the ocean ends or begins; if he should, pursuing his purpose, go on to find the termination of the sea, would that gentleman ever arrive at England?

Again, if any bird, in order to find fruit upon a tree in a certain place should there arrive, and, instead of eating the fruit, should say: I must see the end of this space; and accordingly pursue its object, would that bird ever again return to partake of the fruit of the tree?

Again: if any man, wishing to drink water, should dig a well, and on finding water should say: I must find the end of this earth, and again continue his digging, where to him would be any advantage in finding water?

Again: if any person be afflicted with cholera, and one of his friends, desiring to administer medicine, should run for a doctor, state the symptoms of his friend's complaint, and be supplied with suitable remedies, oils, pills, etc., and the person who so went for medicine should, instead of making haste to return with the medicine, begin to question the doctor thus: Whose pill is this? Whose oil is this? Who made this pill? Who made this oil? Where was this pill made? Where was this oil made? In what book is this pill mentioned? In what book is this oil mentioned? To whom does this book belong? Where and by whom was this book written? Etc., etc. If he should, by such inquiries delay his return, the sick man, not receiving the medicine at the proper time, would surely die.¹⁶

When we illustrate and examine this subject by many such parables, who can feel that the *pādrī*'s views are correct? Do we not feel convinced that Buddha was right? Therefore the several Buddhas did not either inquire into the origin of being, or preach respecting it: and those who receive their advice have no permission from them to engage in this research.

That which is born of man, is man; of an elephant, is an elephant; of a horse, is a horse; of a fowl, is a fowl; of snakes and reptiles, are snakes and reptiles. That which makes these various forms of being is Karmaya [the demerit or merit accumulated in previous states of existence],¹⁷ not any god; not Māraya, not Brahma, not Buddha, nor parents, nor Jehovah.¹⁸ If one of these be the Maker of all, all children born would be of one colour, of one disposition, of one nature, the same in wisdom, equal in happiness, and of the same race. But, some are black, some are red, some are white, some are tall, some are low in stature, some are lame, some are blind, some are deaf, some are wise, some are stupid, some are kind, some are cruel, some are happy, some are unhappy; and after this manner since there is a great diversity of circumstances we cannot see that there is any author of being except Karmaya.

Of one mother ten children are born: one is born blind, one lame, one dumb, one deaf, one red, one brown, one black, one fair, one white, one white-red.

According to the assertion of the book to which this is a reply, these ten children had no previous existence, and consequently had committed no deed of merit or demerit. Their parents possess not the qualities of all these children: neither did Adam and Eve who, it is said, were the first human beings brought into existence. Being so; if Jehovah creates children in the womb, we do not admit either the justice or the mercy of appointing those to suffer who are born without having committed any sin. If these were persons who in previous births had committed sins, or performed virtuous deeds, then they might justly be born in the aforesaid different states; and the justice of such an arrangement is felt and acknowledged by us all.¹⁹

The *pādrī* says that Jehovah is an eternal being. The assertion is altogether erroneous: for, if to other beings there must be a beginning, for what reason should there be no beginning to God? If God is eternal, why should not other existences be eternal? Where is the propriety of there being an origin to some existences, and not to all?²⁰

If the most precious of jewels is eternal, will anyone therefore say that by it were created all other jewels? If a sandalwood tree is eternal, will anyone say that therefore by it were created all other trees? If the sun and moon are eternal, will anyone therefore say that by them were created all the remaining stars and planets? If the great ocean is eternal, does anyone say that therefore by it were created all rivers and streams of water? Even so is the assertion that because Jehovah exists without a cause or causer of his being, he is therefore the Creator of all other existences. The assertion is incredible.

Although Buddha was the All-Wise one, and might have known whether these things were self-originated or had a Creator; yet, finding, himself insufficient for such a research, he did not attempt it. It must therefore to all others be a profitless inquiry.

Nevertheless it is most plainly stated by the pādri that Jehovah created the world and all that is therein; and that he preserves it, and rules it, by his own power.

On this matter we ask; if Jehovah is eternal and the world has existed not more than six thousand years, where was Jehovah before the period of the creation? But, if the world is eternal, then Jehovah is not the Creator of the world, and animate and inanimate beings which are therein.

You say that Jehovah preserves all that he has made, and that he watches over them while they sleep.

Respecting this we ask: Why are some persons found dead in the morning who went in health in the evening to sleep? Why do some persons lose their life by a fall from a tree? Why do many persons perish; some by falling into wells; some by falling from rocks; some devoured by alligators, lions, tigers, bears; some bitten by cobras, vipers and snakes; some by shipwreck, some in war; some by the sword, some by the kris, or knife, or billhook; some by the bursting of a gun when shooting; some even in their mother's womb? Why are unlawfully begotten children destroyed by their parents? Is this worthy to be called preservation?²¹

It is asserted that God rules all that he has made. If so he rules, what is his rule over such as worship Buddha, Vishnu, Iswara, Kandakumāra, Mahomet, Buddha?²² Have you not seen and heard how yearly great multitudes travel to Adam's Peak, to the Perahara in Kandy, to Calāny, and many other places of resort common among Buddhists? How does Jehovah rule over such transactions?²³

Again: from how many countries what vast multitudes visit Kattaragam to worship the god there: How does Jehovah rule respecting this?

Again: in this said book the glory of Buddha is compared to grass and the flower of the field. But, except in mere words, where appears the glory of Jehovah? In this island, in many parts, in many villages, thousands of human beings and cattle have perished by the pestilence. Why did you not cause Jehovah's glory to be seen?

Do we (Buddha's priests) not save from this pestilence countless multitudes by preaching the glory of Buddha? That this is true we can prove by very many witnesses.

Therefore we proclaim that we have no faith in a Creator or in the doctrine of Creation."

While it may now be obvious that speculation about the ultimate origin of sentient and insentient being can have no meaning within the structure of Buddhist logic, and that our author acted in consonance with this presupposition when he dismissed the missionary contention that the Buddha was remiss with respect to the matter of causality, one must note the extent to which confrontation with the Christian doctrine of creation compelled him to go beyond what the Buddha himself recommended as sufficient reply to this heresy (*ditṭhi*). So unprecedented were the exigencies raised by the new interreligious encounter that it was no longer adequate to say, as the Buddha did, that, whether the dogma of creation be true or not, misery and the conditions underlying it still remain; that the elucidation of causality would not promote the religious life that leads to *nibbana*; that it is enough to elucidate misery, the origin of misery, the cessation of misery, and the path leading thereto.²⁵

A posteriori reasoning of this sort, after all, was unconvincing to Christians to whom the inquiry into the origin of being was a pious quest, the answer to which had scriptural warrant and direct bearing upon so many other questions on which the two religions were discordant. The Buddha's references to the deluded beings of the Brahmā world were meant to convince his audience that the idea of an absolute beginning – if indeed he was aware of this idea – was not worth consideration. But for our writer to uphold his tradition against the missionaries who had studied its primary sources with a view towards logical difficulties within them, and in order to restore confidence to those of his compatriots who were disturbed by these alleged problems, he was compelled to point out exactly how the Christian doctrine of creation is poorly reasoned and repugnant to his sense of justice. Yet, by simply negating instead of offering a logical alternative, he reinforced the Buddha's primary contention, that to leave such matters unelucidated does not detract from the religious life.

What we have seen, then, is a transition from the pattern of treating these questions in the Pali canon, which is content to stigmatize them as unedifying without responding to them in terms of logic, to a pattern of argument which takes not only tradition seriously but also that which stands in contradiction to it, the combination of both elements being necessary for an effective apologetics.

If the Buddha did not elucidate the question of causality, it is also true that reasons for rejecting theories that did so were available in the Buddhist tradition but seldom utilized. Under the influence of Christian missions in Ceylon, these arguments were brought to the forefront of discussion, where theretofore they had not played a major role. In verification of this new emphasis in apologetics, we have the testimony of GÖGERLY's protégé DAVID DE SILVA who, when commenting upon his mentor's assertion that the Buddha

knowingly dismissed the doctrine of creation,²⁶ declared that "The Buddhists in general do now openly deny the existence of a Creator."²⁷

¹ For details on later developments in Buddhist apologetics, see L. A. WICKREMERATNE, *Religion, Nationalism, and Social Change in Ceylon, 1865–1885*, in: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1969 (no. 2) 123–50.

² For the Portuguese, vide: 95: 5–8, and for the Dutch, 99:125 (*Cūlavamsa*, pt. 2, WILHELM GEIGER, trans., Colombo 1953).

³ ROBRECHT BOUDENS, *The Catholic Church in Ceylon under Dutch Rule*, Rome 1957, 192, 196–97. The Dutch Governor IMAN WILLEM FALCK, being interested in the majority religion of the island under his authority, submitted a series of questions to leading Buddhist figures in 1766, a summary of the answers to which, including remarks on Christianity, can be found in REGINALD S. COPLESTON, *Buddhism: Primitive and Present in Magadha and in Ceylon*, London 1908, 243–54.

⁴ Data for the years 1849–61 show that tracts were printed at the rate of 1250 per 1000 people in Ceylon, whereas in India 50 per 1000 (JOHN MURDOCH and JAMES NICHOLSON, *Classified Catalogue of Printed Tracts and Books in Singhalese*, Madras 1868, iv–v.).

⁵ KITSIRI MALALGODA, *Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750–1900: A Study of Religious Revival and Change*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976, 191–231, *passim*. Idem, *The Buddhist-Christian Confrontation in Ceylon, 1800–1880*, *Social Compass*, 20 (1973) 171–200.

⁶ Apart from the tract at hand, source materials are indeed few and limited in scope in the decades prior to the 1860s. The Murdoch-Nicholson catalogue (*op. cit.*, 3–35, *passim*) records that missionary presses occasionally printed tracts responding to "Buddhist objections to Christianity", but these dealt primarily with social matters (e.g., meat-consumption and alcohol). D. J. GÖGERLY mentions having read a "controversial tract written by a Buddhist priest of Matura [Mātarā]", which cannot now be located (quoted in J. EMERSON TENNENT, *Christianity in Ceylon*, London 1850, 240). The earliest complete anti-Christian ms. still preserved was written ca. 1839 in reply to certain misstatements in a Christian almanac about Buddhist cosmology (D. M. DE Z. WICKREMASINGHE, *Catalogue of the Sinhalese Manuscripts in the British Museum*, London 1900, ms. 2656).

⁷ Ms., WILLIAM BRIDGNELL, Goddapitiya (an inland mission station), to the Society, March 1847. Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Archives, School of Oriental and African Studies (London). The Ms. has no reference number. BRIDGNELL'S own heading for the tract is *Literary Opposition of the Singhalese to the Doctrine of Creation*.

⁸ MURDOCH and NICHOLSON, *op. cit.*, 17.

⁹ Quoted in TENNENT, *op. cit.*, 281–82.

¹⁰ D. J. GÖGERLY, *Brahmajāla Sutta*, in: *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1 (1846–47) 13–83. Gogerly's first study of this sutta, for missionary application, was printed in the *Ceylon Friend*, 1838. For a review of research since the time of GÖGERLY on the *Brahmajāla* and two similar suttas, the *Pāṭika* and *Aggaṇṇa*, see the article by BANDULA JAYAWARDHANA, s. v. *Ābhassara*, in: *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (G. P. MALALSEKERA, ed.) fasc. 1, Colombo 1961.

¹¹ *Brahmā* boastfully attributes to himself thirteen grand titles. Two among them, *kattā* and *nimattā*, GÖGERLY translates as "creator", an unfortunate choice, as its Christian connotations obscure their more exact meanings, "agent, maker, artificer."

¹² *Brahmajāla Sutta* 2.1–15.

¹³ In the Pali canon, Brahmā's intellectual capacities are never rated highly, and in this connection we take note of an amusing story in the *Kevaladdha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (11.67): Upon being asked where the elements (earth, water, fire, wind) cease, the priest KEVADDHA set out for the Brahmā world to inquire of Brahmā, who surrounded by his retinue of gods, merely replies, "I, O priest, am Brahmā, Great Brahmā, the Supreme Being, the Unsurpassed, the Perceiver of All Things, the Controller, the Lord of All, the Maker, the Fashioner, the Chief, the Victor, the Ruler, the Father of All Beings Who Have Been and are to Be." After several rounds of such unproductive conversation, Brahmā drew KEVADDHA aside and whispered into his ear, "O priest, these gods of my suite believe as follows: 'Brahmā sees all things; knows all things; has penetrated all things.' Therefore was it that I did not answer you in their presence. I, O priest, do not know where these four elements . . . utterly cease" (HENRY CLARKE WARREN, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge Mass. 1915, 308–15).

¹⁴ D. J. GOGERLY, *Buddhism*, in: *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 5 (1867–70) 112.

¹⁵ MURDOCH and NICHOLSON, *op. cit.*, 11.

¹⁶ Cf. the *Mālunkhyāputta Sutta* (63) of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, where the Buddha illustrates, with the story of a man wounded by a poisoned arrow, that the religious life he taught and exemplified does not depend upon final solutions to metaphysical speculations (vide: WARREN, *op. cit.*, 120–21).

¹⁷ Cf. *Visuddhimagga* (17) and *Milindapañha* (65.11) where the contrarities in human nature, being due to variable karmic repercussions, are likened to the differences between seeds which produce innumerable species of vegetation (vide: WARREN, *op. cit.*, 201–02, 214–15).

¹⁸ Māra, the Buddha's tempter, is mentioned here along with Brahmā because "the world of men and gods" is considered their condominium.

¹⁹ Although Buddhists and Hindus disagree on that which transmigrates and experiences karmic repercussions, they concur in the presupposition that *karman* must account for distinctions between sentient beings. Likewise, both religions agree that if beings do not preexist but originate through an *ex nihilo* creative act, then God is implicated in all that is wrong with them. With virtually identical phraseology, Hindu apologists on the continent were levelling the same argument at missionaries there, also in the 1840s. For details, consult: RICHARD FOX YOUNG, *Resistant Hinduism: Sanskrit Sources on Anti-Christian Apologetics in Early Nineteenth-Century India*, Vienna 1981, 112–13, 125–26.

²⁰ These are the same cursory and rhetorical questions which in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* provide the opportunity for the Buddha to malign the idea that some sentient beings are eternal and others not.

²¹ Cf. the remark of NILAKANTHA GOREH, a Hindu apologist writing against Christianity ca. 1844: "That God would be vicious who, for no rational purpose, capriciously brings into being such creatures as tigers and snakes, which cause calamities for everyone" (*Śāstratattvavivirṇaya*, 2:166). NILAKANTHA's other arguments are translated and analyzed in YOUNG, *op. cit.*, chapters, IV, V, and VI.

²² "Iswara" (Skt. *īśvara*, lord) is a common nomen proprium for Śiva. The author probably hereby alludes to the Tamil-speaking Hindus concentrated in the northern districts, the majority of whom are Śaivite. "Kandakumāra" (Skt. *Skandhakumāra*; = Kārtikeya, Śiva's son, the god of warfare), although a Hindu deva originally, is worshipped along with Viṣṇu by the Sinhalese, who regard them as guardians of Buddhism and helpers in mundane matters.

²³ Sinhalese believe that the Buddha left the imprint of one foot (śrī pāda) upon the summit of Mount Sumanakūṭa, widely known as Adam's Peak (*Mahāvamsa*, 1.77). The Perahara (Perahāra) is an annual procession, in August, to the Temple of the Tooth (Daḷadā Māligāva) in Kandy, where a dental remnant, believed to be the Buddha's, is preserved and worshipped as a relic. The Buddha himself is thought to have visited Calāny (Kālāṇiya), near Colombo, where the Maha Raja Vihāre of the Siyam fraternity is now located.

²⁴ The devale (shrine) at Kataragama, in the southeast of Ceylon, is dedicated to Skandha (vide: n. 22, *supra*). It attracts both Hindu and Buddhist pilgrims.

²⁵ Sutta 63, *Majjima Nikāya* (WARREN, *op. cit.*, 121–22).

²⁶ GÖGERLY, *Buddhism*, 113; vide n. 14, *supra*.

²⁷ Many of the apologetical patterns mentioned here, Buddhist and Christian, continue to be advocated today. See, for example, vol. 11 (n. s., 1975) of *Dialogue* (Journal of the Study Centre for Religion and Society, Colombo) the whole of which responds to *A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God* (Colombo 1975), by a Sinhalese Buddhist, Gunapala Dharmasiri.